

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 201535Z JAN 76 ZFF-1

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2064

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

DIRNSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 0473

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARRIMAN,
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY ISA JORDAN AND DIRECTOR NSA
GENERAL ALLEN FROM AMBASSADOR MACOMBER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MASS, TU

SUBJ: TURKISH BASE NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 012741 DTG 172053Z JAN 76

1. IN THIS TELEGRAM I AM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE ONE
DAY'S POSTPONEMENT IN MY SESSIONS WITH SEC GEN ELEKDAG
TO REVIEW WITH YOU MY THINKING RE CURRENT ENGOTIATIONS.
I WILL ALSO DISCUSS OUR GAME PLAN FOR THE EXTREMELY
SHORT PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND WHEN FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL
IS DUE IN WASHINGTON TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT DESIGNED TO
PERMIT THE RESUMPTION ON A FULL SCALE OF ALL OF OUR
SECURITY ACTIVITIES HERE. THE AGREEMENT WILL, OF COURSE,
HAVE THE ADDITIONAL PURPOSE OF PAVING THE WAY FOR
HSTRENGTHENING OF OUR BROADER SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS.

2. IN THIS LATTER CONNECTION WE MUST BEAR CONSTANTLY
IN MIND THAT THE OPERATIONS OF OUR INSTALLATIONS HERE
ARE ONLY PART, AND NOT RPT NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT
PART, OF OUR OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. VALUABLE

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AS THEY ARE, THEY ARE SECONDARY TO THE HEART OF THAT

RELATIONSHIP, U.E., A CONTINUING US-TURKISH COOPERATION WHICH PERMITS THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES TO REMAIN A CREDIBLE, FORMIDABLE AND STABLE DETERRENT ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO.

3. BUT THE INSTALLATIONS ARE, OF COURSE, EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN THEIR OWN RIGHT. IF WE DO NOT GET THEM OPERATING SOON, THEY WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO ATROPHY TO A POINT WHICH PLACES THEM, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER (ATTRITION AND RESTARTING COSTS), BEYOND FULL REVIVAL. MOREOVER, THE CONTINUING PARALYSIS OF THESE ACTIVITIES INEVITABLY SPREADS ITS POISON INTO THE BROADER AND MORE IMPORTANT SECURITY RELATIONSHIP JUST NOTED. BECAUSE OF BOTH THE ATTRITION AND "SPREADING POISON" PROBLEMS, THEREFORE, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BRING NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. PROLONGED DRIFT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN IN THE END HAVE JUST AS ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES AS FAILURE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THAT REASON, I HAVE WELCOMED THE "DEADLINE" SET BY THE SECRETARY'S INVITATION FOR CAGLAYANGIL'S MID-FEBRUARY WASHINGTON VISIT, EVEN THOUGH I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A TARGET DATE WILL PLACE HEAVY BURDENS INDEED ON YOU AND OUR WASHINGTON BACKSTOPPING TEAM IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD.

4. DESPITE THE IMPORTANCE TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES OF A RAPID AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THEY ARE BEING CONDUCTED UNDER EXTRAORDINARILY NEGATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES FROM EACH COUNTRY'S VANTAGE POINT, AND--TO PUT IT BLUNTLY--MAY FAIL. WHILE THERE ARE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES WHICH RECOGNIZE OUR CLEARLY MUTUAL INTEREST IN HAVING THE RELATIONSHIP RETURNED TO HEALTH, EACH SIDE HAS BEEN "TURNED OFF" IN A SERIOUS WAY BY THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OTHER. ON THE TURKS' SIDE, THE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE OF THE EMBARGO LEFT SCARS OF A FAR DEEPER AND MORE IRRADICABLE CHARACTER THAN SEEMS GENERALLY REALIZED IN WASHINGTON. THE TURK VERSION OF THE CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS SEES TURKEY AS THE SINNED-AGAINST PARTY ENTIRELY. IT

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PERMITS NO RECOGNITION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN PHASE II OF THE FIGHTING. IT IS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THE CONCEPT THAT ITS BEST FRIEND PUT A KNIFE TO THE JUGLAR VEIN OF ITS NATIONAL SURVIVAL. THIS HAS LEFT A RESIDUAL ANGER AND BITTERNESS HERE, THE DEPTH AND Pervasiveness OF WHICH IS HARD TO OVERSTATE. AND TURK NEGOTIATION TRYING TO BRING THE TURK POSITIONS IN THE

NEGOTIATING PROCESS INTO A MORE REASONABLE POSTURE MUST DEAL WITH IT EVERY DAY. THEIR PROBLEM IS FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY THE UNIVERSAL AWARENESS HERE THAT THE EMBARGO IS ONLY PARTIALLY LIFTED AND HENCE THAT THE U.S. "JUGLAR VIEN TACTIC" STILL CONTINUES.

AA5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TURKS ARE NOT THE ONLY PARTY WHICH HAS BEEN "TURNED OFF." SOME OF THE NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS I HAVE RECEIVED REFLECT A LESS FAR REACHING BUT SIMILAR DEVELOPMENT IN WASHINGTON. THIS STEMS, I AM SURE, FROM (A) THE TURK ACTIONS IN PHASE II OF THE CYPRUS OPERATIONS; (B) TURK FAILURE AFTER THE OCTOBER 2 VOTE TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE CYPRUS SITUATION OR TO PERMIT ANY RESUMPTION WHATSOEVER OF US ACTIVITY ON THE INSTALLATIONS HERE; AND (C) THE GOT' SPRESENTING US IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SHOCKINGLY ONE-SIDED INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION.

6. TO COMPOUND OUR PROBLEMS FURTHER, BOTH SIDES ARE OPERATING UNDER SEVERE AND WEAKENING DOMESTIC POLITICAL INHIBITIONS. IN THE EVENT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ARE A SUCCESS, NEITHER SIDE IS GOING TO WALK AWAY FROM THEM WITH AN EASILY DEFENSIBLE POSITION. BOTH ARE GOING TO HAVE TO SETTLE FOR LESS THAN THEY WANT AND THEN DEFEND THAT OUTCOME WITHIN THEIR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESSES. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE FRAIL DEMIREL GOVERNMENT WILL IN THE END BE PREPARED TO FACE UP TO THIS CHALLENGE IS VERY REAL. BUT SO IS THE REVERSE OF THE COIN. WHATEVER WE COME UP WITH IS HARDLY GOING TO BE A BEST SELLER WITH THE CONGRESS. IT IS ONE THING POSSIBLY TO BE ABLE TO AVOID REIMPOSITION OF THE EMBARGO. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM THE CONGRESS AN ADVANCE FIVE-YEAR \$1 BILLION ASSISTANCE COMMITMENT.

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7. IF PROGRESS BEGINS TO DEVELOP ON CYPRUS, THEN CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS ON OUR SIDE BECOME MORE MALLEABLE. BUT WE MUST BE REALISTIC ABOUT THIS. CYPRUS IS AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM WHERE THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD A LASTING SETTLEMENT ARE WHILE BETTER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN OTHER TIMES, REMAIN HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC.

8. THE TURK ANGER AND FRUSTRATION WITH THE US FOUND ITS OUTLET IN THE UNACCEPTABLY ONE-SIDED OPENING NEGOTIATING POSITION REFERRED TO ABOVE. THE US COUNTER HAS BEEN TO PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS ON A SERIES OF BASIC PRINCIPLES (OF MUTUALITY), AND THE MOST CURRENT EXAMPLE OF THIS UNDERSTANDABLE REFLEX IS WASHINGTON'S LATEST INSTRUCTION TO ME (REFTEL). THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN

REFTEL ARE EMINENTLY SOUND, AND NO VIABLE RESULT CAN BE
BASED ON ANYTHING BUT THESE PRINCIPLES. AS THE
EMBASSY'S REPORTING HAS MADE CLEAR, EACH HAS BEEN
REPEATEDLY PRESENTED TO THE TURKS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO
DATE, AND I WILL NO DOUBT BE FORCED REPEATEDLY TO

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ACTION SS-25

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O 201535Z JAN 76 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2065
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIRNSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 0473

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

REITERATE THEM IN MY FORTHCOMING DISCUSSION WITH ELEKDAG.

9. I WILL BE REITERATING THESE, HOWEVER, IN SUPPORT
OF MY ARGUMENTS FOR SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WHICH WE WANT
IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AND TO EXPLAIN WHY SOME TURK
LANGUAGE IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. FOR HERE THE KEY POINT
IS THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF TURKS WHO ARE NOT RPT NOT
SO OBTUSE AS TO FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE MERIT OF
ALMOST ALL THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE HAVE CONSTANTLY PUT
FORWARD. BUT AFTER THE TRAUMA OF THE EMBARGO, THE TURK
POLITICAL SCENE SIMPLY DOES NOT PERMIT THE US TO
REQUIRE (AS A PRE-CONDITION TO OUR REACHING A RENEWED
RELATIONSHIP) A FORMAL TURK ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF A SERIES
OF US-DRAFTED PRINCIPLES STRESSING THAT THEY OWE US
AS MUCH AS WE OWE THEM. MOREOVER, AGREEMENT ON PRIN-
CIPLES, EVEN IF THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED, IF IT IS NOT
BACKED UP BY AGREED LANGUAGE ON IMPORTANT SPECIFICS,

WIL NOT RPT NOT BE SUFFICIENT FROM THE TURK POINT OF VIEW TO PERMIT A RESUMPTION OF OUR ACTIVITIES.

10. AS I HAVE SAID, I AM NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT WE WILL SUCCEED IN THE CURRENT EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE A
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RESTORED SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, BUT I AM CERTAIN THAT OUR ONLY HOPE LIES IN BOTH SIDES' FOREGOING THEOLOGY AND FINDING WAYS TO MEET EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS IN THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF OUR NEW AGREEMENT. THE TURKS UNDERSTAND OUR PRINCIPLES BETTER THAN THEY OFTEN LET ON, AND THE HOPE IS THAT THEY WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE IN THEIR AGREEMENT TO LANGUAGE TO IN EFFECT IMPLEMENT THESE PRINCIPLES. FOR THAT REASON, THE ESSENTIAL TASK OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAM ELEMENT IN ASHINGTON FROM HERE ON IS TO ESCHEW FURTHER FOCUS ON THE PRINCIPLES THEMSELVES, WHILE DEVELOPING AS RAPIDLY AS FEASIBLE -- IN WHAT MUST BE A RAPID-PACED NEGOTIATION IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD -- LANGUAGE AND COUNTER-LANGUAGE WHICH IMPLEMENTS THESE PRINCIPLES IN A DRAFT AGREEMENT.

11. I DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO PROPOSE ANY LANGUAGE CHANGES UNTIL ELEKDAG INDICATES CLEARLY THAT TURKS CAN LIVE WITH OUR ASSISTANCE AND "GUARANTEE" CONCEPTS AND UNTIL ELEKDAG HAS HIMSELF MADE LANGUAGE CONCESSIONS IN OTHER AREAS. NOR, I WISH TO MAKE CLEAR, DO I ENVISAGE A 50-50 SPLIT OF DIFFERENCES SINCE TURKS STARTED FROM AN EXTREME POSITION AND, EVEN AFTER RECENT WELCOMED SHIFTS, HAVE MUCH FURTHERDITO GO TO REACH "MIDDLE GROUND" THAN DO WE.

12. AS FOR THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, I BELIEVE THERE ARE FOUR ESSENTIAL AREAS THAT IT MUST COVER PRIOR TO SIGNATURE BY THE SECRETARY AND FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL. THE FIRST CONCERNS ITSELF WITH THE LEVEL OF US ASSISTANCE.
HERE I AM WORRIED THAT TURKS DO NOT RPT NOT REALLY BELIEVE THAT \$200 MILLION IS OUR LIMIT ON THE THEORY THAT WE WOULD NOT LEAD OFF, IN A NEGOTIATION OF THIS KIND, WITH OUR FINAL FIGURE. I WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS IN FACT A FINAL FIGURE, BUT IF THE SECRETARY SHOULD SEE CAGLAYANGIL IN EUROPE IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, THIS IS A KEY POINT WHICH HE SHOULD EMPHASIZE. IN ADDITION, ALL OF YOU SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZEIT TO AMBASSADOR ESENBEL. AT THE RIGHT MOMENT, WE MAY ALSO WISH TO OFFER TO STREAMLINE, WHICH COULD MAKE OUR
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ASSISTANCE-LEVEL OFFER EASIER FOR OUR FRIENDS TO DEFEND WITHIN THE GOT. BUT THE MAKING OF SUCH AN OFFER SHOULD DEPEND UPON (A) WHETHER THE TURKS ARE GOING TO BE REASONABLE ABOUT BOTH THE GUARANTEE CONCEPT AND THE ASSISTANCE FIGURE WE OFFER (I AM BY NO MEANS SURE OF THAT), AND (B) BEING CERTAIN WITHIN THE USG THAT OUR WILLINGNESS TO CLOSE KARAMURSEL IS NOT PREDICATED ON IMPRACTICAL PLANS FOR MAKING UP THE DIFFERENCE BY A MAJOR VISIBLE EXPANSION OF SINOP.

13. THE SECOND SUBJECT THE AGREEMENT MUST OBVIOUSLY DEAL WITH IS "GUARANTEES." HERE ONE OF MY KEY CONCERNS IS THAT EVEN IF THE TURKS BUY THE MULTI-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL COMMITMENT (SUBJECT TO ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS) PROPOSAL, THEY MAY TRY TO INSIST THAT THE BASES NOT RPT NOT START UP AGAIN, OR AT LEAST NOT ENTIRELY START UP AGAIN, UNTIL THIS MULTI-YEAR PLAN HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY ENDORSED BY THE CONGRESS. THAT WE MUST AVOID AT ALL COSTS. WE MUST INSIST THAT THE MID-FEBRUARY KISSINGER-CAGLAYANGIL SIGNING IS THE SIGNAL FOR IMMEDIATE AND FULL RESUMPTION OF US ACTIVITIES HERE.

14. THE THIRD GENERAL CATEGORY WHICH WE MUST HAVE RESOLVED AND SPELLED OUT IN THE KISSINGER-CAGLAYANGIL AGREEMENT IS COMMAND AND CONTROL. WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT REACHED FULL AGREEMENT HERE, BUT WE HAVE COME PRETTY CLOSE, CLOSER THAN WE ARE IN ANY OTHER KEY AREA.

15. FINALLY, AND OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, ARE A CLUSTER OF ISSUES GROUPED AROUND WHAT WE CALLED THE "EXTENSION OR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATO/SOFA." HERE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE HARD GTLCG BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL WE GET THE MINIMUM WE NEED, OR, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE SIMPLY CANNOT OPERATE HERE. THE KISSINGER-CAGLAYANGIL AGREEMENT DOES NOT HAVE TO SETTLE ALL OUR NEGOTIATION PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA, BUT THE FEBRUARY AGREEMENT HAS TO GIVE US CERTAIN ABSOLUTE ESSENTIALS IN THE FIELDS OF TAX RELIEF, PERSONNEL SUPPORT, AND MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES TO AND WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

16. AS OF THIS WRITING, I AM NOT RPT NOT SURE THAT THE
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TURKS WILL MAKE COMPROMISES WE MUST HAVE AS AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM IN ANY NEW AGREEMENT WE SIGN. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF FAILING TO COMPREHEND THE PRIN-

CIPLES WE HAVE SET FORTH, AND IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF
FAILING TO PERCEIVE THE IMPORTANCE TO THEM OF THE
US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP. IT IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER
THE PRESENT TURK LEADERSHIP HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUMMON
UP THE NECESSARY POLLITICAL WILL TO MAKE THE MINIMUM
COMPROMISES WHICH WE MUST HAVE IF OUR RELATIONSHIP
IS TO BE PUT BACK TOGETHER AGAIN. AS FOR OUR SIDE, I
ASK YOU TO INSURE THAT UNDERSTANDABLE RESENTMENT
OVER THE INITIAL TURK POSITION NOT PRECLUDE A CONTINUING
DISPLAY ON OUR PART OF LANGUAGE FLEXIBILITY AND
RESOURCEFULNESS OF THE KIND (ALTHOUGH NOT TO THE DEGREE)
WE ARE REQUIRING OF THE TURK SIDE. ABOVE ALL, IN
THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD WE WILL NEED PROMPT RESPONSES
TO OUR LANGUAGE NEEDS AND QUERIES. IF THERE IS GOING TO
BE AGREEMENT, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT WE GET
ALMOST ALL OF ITS ESSENTIALS WORKED OUT BEFORE CAGLAYANGIL
(WHO WILL HAVE LIMITED NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY) APPEARS
IN WASHINGTON. IF TOO MUCH IS LEFT FOR HIS BRIEF VISIT,
THAT VISIT WILL BE A HIGH-RISK EXERCISE INDEED.
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